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Abstract— Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are dynamic wireless networks without any infrastructure. These networks are 
weak against many types of attacks. One of these attacks is the black hole. In this attack, a malicious node advertises itself as 
having freshest or shortest path to specific node to absorb packets to itself. The effect of black hole attack on ad hoc network using 
AODV as a routing protocol will be examined in this research. Furthermore, we investigate solution for increasing security in these 
networks. Simulation results using OPNET simulator depict that packet delivery ratio in the presence of malicious nodes, reduces 
notably. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Ad-hoc networks are characterized by dynamic topology, 
self-configuration, self-organization, restricted power, 
temporary network and lack of infrastructure. Characteristics of 
these networks lead to using them in disaster recovery 
operation, smart buildings and military battlefields [1]. 
Routing protocol in ad-hoc networks are classified into two 
main categories, proactive and reactive [3]. In proactive routing 
protocols, routing information of nodes is exchanged, 
periodically, such as DSDV [4]. In on-demand routing 
protocols, nodes exchange routing information when needed 
such as, AODV [2] and DSR [5]. Furthermore, some ad-hoc 
routing protocols are a combination of above categories. 
Although trusted environment has been assumed in most 
research on ad-hoc routing protocols, many usages of ad-hoc 
network run in untrusted situations. So, most ad-hoc routing 
protocols are vulnerable to diverse types of attacks that one of 
which is black hole attack. In this attack, a malicious node uses 
the routing protocol to advertise itself as having the shortest or 
freshest path to the node whose packets it wants to intercept. In 
a flooding based protocol, the attacker listens to requests for 
routes. When the attacker receives a request for a route to the 
target node, the attacker creates a reply consisting of an 
extremely short or fresh route [6]. The rest of this paper is 
organized as follows: In section 2, AODV routing protocol is 
described. In section 3, we describe classification of attacks in 
MANET. Network layer attack is described in section 4. 
Section 5 summarizes solutions to achieve secure level in ad 
hoc networks. In section 6, simulation results are analyzed.  
II. AODV ROUTING PROTOCOL  
AODV is used to find a route between source and 
destination as needed and this routing protocol uses three 
significant type of messages, route request (RREQ), route reply 
(RREP) and route error (RERR).  Field information of these 
messages, such as source sequence number, destination 
sequence number, hop count and etc is explained in detail in 
[2]. Each node has a routing table, which contains information 
about the route to the specific destination. When source node 
wants to communicate with a destination and there is not any 
route between them in its routing table, at first step source node 
broadcasts RREQ. So, RREQ is received by intermediate nodes 
that they are in the transmission range of sender. These nodes 
broadcast RREQ until RREQ is received by destination or an 
intermediate node that has fresh enough route to the 
destination. Then it sends RREP unicastly toward the source. 
Hence, a route among source and destination is made. A fresh 
enough route is a valid route entry that its destination sequence 
number is at least as great as destination sequence number in 
RREQ. The source sequence number is used to determine 
freshness about route to the source. In addition, destination 
sequence number is used to determine freshness of a route to 
the destination. When intermediate nodes receive RREQ, with 
consideration of source sequence number and hop count, make 
or update a reverse route entry in its routing table for that 
source. Furthermore, when intermediate nodes receive RREP, 
with consideration of destination sequence number and hop 
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count, make or update a forward route entry in its routing table 
for that destination.  
III. CLASSIFICATION OF ATTACKS IN MANET 
The attacks in MANET can be classified into two 
categories, called passive attacks and active attacks. Passive 
attacks are done to steal information of network such as, 
eavesdropping attacks and traffic analysis attacks. Indeed, 
passive attackers get data exchanged in the network without 
disrupting the operation of a network and modification of 
exchanged data. On the other hand, in active attacks, 
replication, modification and deletion of exchanged data is 
done by attackers. The attacks in ad-hoc networks can also be 
classified into two categories, called external attacks and 
internal attacks. Internal attacks are done by authorized node in 
the network, whereas external attacks are executed by nodes 
that they are not authorized to participate in the network 
options. Another classification of attacks is related to protocol 
stacks, for instance, network layer attacks.  
IV. NETWORK LAYER ATTACKS IN MANET 
Some network layer attacks are described in below: 
A. Wormhole attack 
In this attack, an attacker records a packet, at one location 
in the network, tunnels the packet to another location and 
replays it there [21]. 
B. Byzantine attack  
In this attack, malicious nodes individually or cooperatively 
carry out attacks such as creating routing loops and forwarding 
packets through non-optimal paths.  
C. Rushing attack 
Rushing attacker forwards packets quickly by skipping 
some of the routing processes. So, in on-demand routing 
protocol such as AODV, the route between source and 
destination include rushing nodes. 
D. Resource consumption attack 
In this attack, an attacker attempts to consume battery life 
of other nodes. 
E. Location disclosure attack 
In this attack, information relating to structure of network is 
revealed by attacker nodes. 
F. Black hole attack 
In black hole attack, malicious nodes falsely claim a fresh 
route to the destination to absorb transmitted data from source 
to that destination and drop them instead of forwarding. 
Black hole attack in AODV protocol can be classified into 
two categories: black hole attack caused by RREP and black 
hole attack caused by RREQ. 
1) Black hole attack caused by RREQ 
With sending fake RREQ messages an attacker can form 
black hole attack as follows: 
a)  Set the originator IP address in RREQ to the 
originating node’s IP address. 
b) Set the destination IP address in RREQ to the 
destination node’s IP address. 
c) Set the source IP address of IP header to its own IP 
address. 
d)  Set the destination IP address of IP header to 
broadcast address. 
e) Choose high sequence number and low hop count 
and put them in related fields in RREQ. 
So, false information about source node is inserted to the 
routing table of nodes that get fake RREQ. Hence, if these 
nodes want to send data to the source, at first step they send it 
to the malicious node. 
2) Black hole attack caused by RREP 
With sending fake RREP messages an attacker can form 
black hole attack. After receiving RREQ from source node, a 
malicious node can generate black hole attack by sending 
RREP as follow: 
a) Set the originator IP address in RREP to the 
originating node’s IP address. 
b) Set the destination IP address in RREP to the 
destination node’s IP address. 
c) Set the source IP address of IP header to its own IP 
address. 
d) Set the destination IP address of IP header to the IP 
address of node that RREQ has been received from it. 
V. SOLUTIONS TO ACHIEVE SECURE LEVEL IN AD HOC 
NETWORKS  
There are basically two approaches to secure MANET: 
1.securing ad-hoc routing and 2.Intrusion detection [7]. 
A. Securing routing  
Ariadne [8] has proposed ad-hoc routing protocol that 
provides security in MANET and relies on efficient symmetric 
cryptography. This protocol is based on the basic operation of 
the DSR protocol. In [9], a secure routing protocol based on 
DSDV has been proposed. Hash chains have been used to 
authenticate hop counts and sequence numbers. ARAN [10] 
uses cryptographic public-key certificates in order to achieve 
the security goals. The goal of SAR [11] is to characterize and 
explicitly represent the trust values and trust relationships 
associated with ad-hoc nodes and use these values to make 
routing decisions. Secure AODV (SAODV) [12] is a security 
extension of AODV protocol, based on public key 
cryptography. Hash chains are used in this protocol to 
authenticate the hop count. Adaptive SAODV (A-SAODV) 
[13] has proposed a mechanism based on SAODV for 
improving the performance of SAODV. In [14] a bit of 
modification has been applied to A-SAODV for increasing its 
performance. TRP [20] employs hash chain algorithm to 
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generate a token, which is appended to the data packets to 
identify the authenticity of the routing packets and to choose 
correct route for data packets. TRP provides significant 
reduction in energy consumption and routing packet delay by 
using hash algorithm. 
B. Intrusion detection system  
[15] introduces a method that requires each intermediate 
node to send back the next hop information inside  RREP 
message. This method uses further request message and further 
reply message to verify the validity of the route. Zhang and Lee 
[16] propose a distributed and cooperative intrusion detection 
model based on statistical anomaly detection techniques. In 
[17], the intermediate node requests its next hop to send a 
confirmation message to the source. After receiving both route 
reply and confirmation message, the source determines the 
validity of path according to its policy. In [18], Huang et al use 
both specification-based and statistical-based approaches. They 
construct an Extended Finite State Automation (EFSA) 
according to the specification of AODV routing protocol and 
model normal state and detect attacks with anomaly detection 
and specification-based detection. An approach based on 
dynamic training method in which the training data is updated 
at regular time intervals has been proposed in [19].  
 
TABLE I.    SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
 
Simulation parameters Value 
Number of nodes 46 
Network size 600*600(m) 
Simulation duration 600(sec) 
Transmit power(w) .0001 
Packet Reception-power Threshold(dBm) -95 
Hash function SHA-1 
Source node Mobile-node-1 
Destination node Mobile-node-4 
Packet Inter-Arrival Time(sec) Uniform(.1,.11) 
Packet size(bits) Exponential(1024) 
 
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS & CONCLUSION 
For the simulation, we use OPNET 14.0.A [22] as a 
simulator. Our network topology is indicated in Fig. 1. TABLE 
I contains parameters that we choose for simulation. For 
evaluating the performance of the network, we consider the 
following metric: 
Packet Delivery Ratio: The ratio of the data delivered to the 
destination to the data sent out by the source. 
Various mobilities of nodes have been considered to 
measure the performance of network in presence of malicious 
nodes as attackers. Fig. 2 demonstrates the results in presence 
of only one malicious node. Results in Fig 3, 4 and 5 have been 
obtained in existence of 2, 3 and 4 attackers. The average of  
 
Figure 1.  Network topology 
 
 
Figure 2.  PDR in presence of one malicious node 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  PDR in presence of two malicious node 
 
 
Figure 4.  PDR in presence of three malicious node 
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Figure 5.  PDR in presence of four malicious node 
packet delivery ratio in each case has been shown in table 2. 
As it is revealed by these figures, PDR reduces remarkably in 
presence of black hole attackers. 
 
TABLE II.    THE AVERAGE OF PACKET DELIVERY RATIO VS. 
DIFFERENT NUMBER OF ATTACKERS   
 
 Normal AODV Normal AODV under attack 
One attacker 0.8578 0.3525 
Two attackers 0.8578 0.3445 
Three attackers 0.8578 0.2934 
Four attackers 0.8578 0.2179 
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